Due to non-compliance with the relevant regulations for listing on NASDAQ, and Qutoutiao's abandonment of efforts to regain the listing standards within 180 days, on March 20th, Qutoutiao announced this decision, which implies that Qutoutiao will be delisted from NASDAQ and trading will be suspended starting March 23rd.

At the beginning of its listing on NASDAQ, Qutoutiao was also in the limelight, but unfortunately, the highest price on the first day was the highest since its listing, plummeting from $209.9 per share to as low as $0.3 per share, with the maximum shrinkage reaching an astonishing 99.8%!

Of course, it's not surprising that Qutoutiao has fallen to the point of delisting. As early as April 2022, operational issues had already emerged. As a new media platform, Qutoutiao ceased its self-media content creation platform services, which undoubtedly cut off the "production end," marking Qutoutiao's entry into the "late maintenance" phase. Once delisted from NASDAQ, it is feared that there will be little chance of making a comeback.

Continuous losses and difficulties in business development are likely the reasons for Qutoutiao's delisting.

In the internet field, Ma Huateng's summary in 2022 was the most concise: "No longer believe in buying volume." If during the rapid development phase of the industry, I dare to guarantee that Qutoutiao still had a chance to catch its breath because there will always be capital willing to invest heavily. However, with the industry maturing and coupled with a crisis, Qutoutiao could only be delisted without resistance.

Such is the larger context, but the bigger issue is that Qutoutiao's strategic positioning is flawed.

It must be acknowledged as a fact that Qutoutiao was born in a post-internet era, where although there are still industry dividends, the market has basically been divided up.

Qutoutiao was founded in June 2016, and it must be said that it was a miracle to be listed on NASDAQ in September 2018.

Faced with the increasingly mature situation of new media platforms, Qutoutiao must find a new path to achieve a counterattack. Pinduoduo is a case in point, launched in April 2015, and in less than a year, it was able to quickly open up the market and tear a gap in the fiercely competitive e-commerce field, which is truly impressive.

As a seasoned internet person and a serial entrepreneur, Tan Si Liang must have repeatedly pondered over Pinduoduo's model. The strategy of "surrounding the cities from the countryside" was borrowed by Pinduoduo's Huang Zheng from Duan Yongping.Thus, in 2016, Tan Sili had a flash of inspiration, most likely drawing from the Pinduoduo case. The reason for this observation is that Qutoutiao's positioning is aimed at people in third-tier cities and below.

As expected, Tan Sili's Qutoutiao, like Huang Zheng's Pinduoduo, quickly opened up the market. The problem lies in the fact that Qutoutiao is different from Pinduoduo; Qutoutiao must undergo a second transformation, whereas Pinduoduo does not need to.

Pinduoduo rapidly gained a customer base through "low prices" and the strategy of having acquaintances help with a "slash"; Qutoutiao, through means such as forwarding and earning money by reading news, also gained a large customer base.

Pinduoduo's users are their customers; however, Qutoutiao's users require investment to generate traffic. The issue arises here—if one day the "investment" stops, the traffic disappears.

Some might argue that with a large number of users, there's no need to worry about making money. The key is that these users are here to earn money, not to read news. The group that reads news does not overlap with the population of third, fourth, and fifth-tier cities! Pinduoduo is different; users who like cheap products are in the lower market.

In other words, there is a significant misalignment between Qutoutiao's product and user positioning.

Users in the lower market do not like to read news; they only like to "earn money by reading news," which is obviously fatal. Once the platform lacks subsidies, user stickiness will disappear. The effectiveness of advertising will deteriorate, and advertisers will reassess the platform. As advertising revenue declines, it becomes increasingly difficult to turn a profit.

It is particularly important to emphasize that the "lower market" prefers to watch videos rather than read analytical articles because watching videos is less mentally taxing. This is undoubtedly fatal for Qutoutiao, which has not yet become profitable, and its users are being drawn away by short video platforms.

From a business model perspective, Qutoutiao's positioning in the lower market contains strategic errors, and after having a large customer base, it must consider transforming immediately. The short video sector is more suitable for the lower market, with TikTok and Kuaishou both being established in 2016.I believe that the failure of Qutoutiao stems from not clearly considering its commercial core and not seizing the opportunity for transformation.